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6239
IN THE SUPRErviE COuRT OF THE STATE OF

UTAH
A .111. BELL,

PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT
vs.
PARLEY P. JONES,
DEFENDANT,, APPELLANT
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a judgement for
the plaintiff, rendered by Judge Lewis
Jones in the District Court of
County, sitting without a

C~che

ju~,

in an

action to recover on a prommissory note
executed by the defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February

6, 1928, defendant purchased

land from the plaintiff's father

251-t.

(14,21~

Plaintiff's father executed an

~~-Reference

to page in abstract of record.
]L
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escrow agreement on that date, under
which the price was $3,200.00, the def-·
endant to pay $200.00 down in cash,
which he did that day (9,21,25).

the· same day, plaintiff's assignor

On
as~

\

igned the escrow to the Utah Mar tgage
Loan Corporation (14,15).
In December, 1930, defendant assumed

a

mortgages for plaintiff's assignor in
the amount of $100 and $1,000 as part
of the balance of the purchase price

(6,9,21,2.51.

In the same month, defend-

ant borrowed $2,000.00 from Mr. Bodrenm
to pay Mr. Bell, and executed to Mr.
Bodrero, a mortgage on the land for the
loan (21,22,23).

The abstract fails to

state how much of this was:paid to the
plaintiff's father, but the

defen~ant

states that he got the loan to finish

paying Mr. Bell (21).
his

assign~ent

Defendant, in

of errors, alleges that
2
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he paid plaintiff's father

$580 on this

contract during the years 1928, 1929,

1930, 1931 and 1G32 (30), in addition
to the sums mentioned, but this point
is not substantiated further in the
record.
On July 20, 1934, defendant executed the

note in question in the amount of $850.00
and·delivered it to A. J. Bell, who is
plaintiff's assignor and father (1,5,

7).

Plaintiff's assignor states that

he thought the note wasgiven to him
after the scale down agreement was completed (25).
The seale down agreement was executed
on August 13, 1934, when A.J.Bell, Mr.
Bodrero, and the Utah Mortgage L.oan
Corporation (which was the mortgagee of
the mortgages assumed by the defendant)
stipulated that the defendant was indebted to them and that in consideration of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

receiving cash or bonds then, they would
scale down the indebtednessof defendant
and accept the following sums in full
satisfaction of their claims against

th~

defendant (2,3,5,6,7,12,13,14,21,22,24,

25,26):
Louis F. Bodrero
Utah Mortgage Loan
Alfred J. Bell

$1,850.00

$1,100~00.
~$150.

oo.

Mr. Bodrero and the Utah Mortgage Loan
Corporation accepted and were paid in
bonds of the Federal Farm Mortgage
~orporation

and Mr. Bell_ received his

payment in cash at that time (13,14,2).
Mr. A.J.Bell signed a scale down and
release as follows (12,13):
"Now, therefore, the undersigned
creditor of said applicant hereby.
agrees that it will accept the sum
of $150.00 in full satisfaction of
the existing obligation of $4oo.om
now due it from said appl_i cant a.ndl.
will execute a full andunconditional release of said obligation to be
made in Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds. 11
Defendant stated that he understood that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

all the loans were cancelled after the
scale down and payment (22).
Later, in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937,
plaintiff or his assignor induced or
coerced the defendant into making payments on the note as follows (1,4,22):

16, 1935
July 30, 1935
November 12, 1935
eptember 12, 1936
November 12 , 1936
hlarch 12, 1937
August 12, 1937
March

s_

$~5.00
$15~00

$50.00

150~00

50.00

lo.oo$4o.oo.

The payments after 1935 were made by check
payable to A. J. Bell (14), and they were
collected by the plaintiff.

Thereafter,

defendant refused to pay, andplaintiff
brought this action, claiming to be
holder in due course (3).

a

He took the

note on June 15, 1936 (3,16,17).

At

that time, according to plaintiff's records, he had advanced his father $215.00

(16).

Plaintiff then tried to show
\

other subsequent advancements to his father

5
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in the amounts of ~~108.23 (16). ~:~127 .. 7.5

(17},

~:~1?5.ooll8},

$1o,oo

(20), q~2o.oo

(lq), $38.50 (19), to prove that he advanc~d

this money after he received the

note 2.!!. the strength of the note (17).
Pla·intiff also testified on cross exam-

ination:

Q: You can't produce any records of
what your father·paid back?
A: No, I can't.-.. ~ father andmothe:r
had accommodated me, so,I turned that
iiiOiley to them a't thattime .- I ad vanced the money-to them because they needed it ••• ( 19).
Plaintiff's father testified (26):
I don't remember what my so-n had done

for me before he came back from Monolulu. I can 1 t remember where or \IVhen
it was that I turned the note over to
him. I know immediately after he returned from Honolulu hepaid my wife's
hospital bill. I could not say ~qw
soon ••• We, like other parents did a
lot for our children, they·help ~ back later on. I hope we are not diff~
erent from Other r·olks in that respecte.
The 6ourt found due execution and delivery of the note on July 30, 1934 (7},
and that principal owing on it was

6

$701.
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63 andinterest of $167.26 (8), and awarded

$85.00 attorney's fees (8).
Plaintiff was found to bean assignee of
the note (8).
At the time of execution of the note,
defendant was found to be indebted to
plaintiff's assignor in the amount of

$1,250.00, and that he took the note
for $850.00 and~scaled the balance of

$4oo. 00 down for $150 (8) •

The oo 1..1rt

found that the note was the balance due
on the land sold

(8,9,11~12).

The court found that the ~~850. 00 was not_.

compromised and that the plaintiff's
assignor never agreed that he was owed
no more than

31).

$4oo.oo

(5,7,9,10,22,25,29~

The payments were found to have

been made voluntarily and the note was
voluntarily executed and for a valuable
a:onsideration (10).
Thereupon, the Court gave judgement to

7
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the plaintiff for $959.89.

TI-IE

PRESENTED

QBl~STIONS

WERE THE ADVANCEMENTS TO THE FATHER MADE.

WITH A BONA FIDE EXPECTATION OF

REPAY~

MENT AND DID THE FATHER EXPECT TO REPAYTHEM SO THAT THEY MAY BE CLASSED AS

AN~

-'!

TECEDENTtDEBTS
AND THEREFORE
1

SUFFIC~ENTi

. l

VALUE TO CONSTITUTE PLAINTIFF A HOLDER
IN DUE COURSE!
:

"

WAS THE ADVANCEMENT BEFORE DELIVERY OF
THE NOTE SO SMALL AS TO IMPUTE THAT THE
PLAIKTIFF TOOK IN BAD
GOOD

FAITH~

OR NOT IN

FAITH!

IF DEFENDANT. HAD PAID THE WHOLE $2,000.00

5%

TO MR. BELL, THEN AT MOST UNDER A
RATE OFINTEREST, HE

~OULD

BELL $355.00, OR AT

4%,

#

HAVE ONLY OWED
-

.

ONLY $240.00.

ON THESE FACTS, COULD THERE BE ANY CON6

SIDERATION FOR THE

NOTE~

DID THE SCALE DOWN AGREEMENT GIVE THE
PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR A
8

COMPL~TE

ACCORD
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AND SATISFACTION OF ALL OF THE DEBTS
OWED HIM BY THE DEFENDANT?.

IS THE PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR

ES~roPPED

TO ASSERT THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTE, INASMUCH AS HE STOOD BY AND REPRESENTED
THAT ONLY $400.00 WAS OWEDTO HIM, KNOWING THAT THE DEFENDANT WOULD
~~E

NOT

HAVE

THE LOAN IF HE COULD NOT COMPROMISE

ALL OF HIS DEB.T, ANDTHEN COMPROMISED
FOR A FULL SATISFACTION OF HISCLAIM FOR

$150.00!
IS THE NOTE VOID OR UNENFORCEABLE AS

AGAINST

PUBLIC POLICY

IN THAT

IT

TENDED

TO OR ACTUALLY THVVARTED THE PURPOSE OF
THE FETIERAL FARM MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION'. STATUTE!

CAN PLAINTIFF', BY SHOWING THAT . HE TOOK

THE NOTE WITH A PART PAYMENT TO THE
ASSIGNOR, CONTEI\'iPLATING PAYING MORE LATER,

BE A HOLDERIN.DUE COURSE FOR MORE THAN
HE PAID WHEN HE RECEIVED

9

NOTIC~

OF THE
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DEFECT IN

THE INSTRUMENT!

STATElVIENT OFPOIN.TS

PLAINTIFF' ISNJT A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

BECAlTSE HE DID NOT PAY VALUE and, (1)
HE DIDNOT TAKE IN. GOOD FAITH.

(2)

THEREFORE THE PERSONAL DEFENSES OF THE
~:IA~'~R

(1.)

ARE GOOD AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
THERE WAS NO

CONSIDERATION

FOR THE

NOTE.
(2)

THE MAKER ~ND PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR

FAD A COMPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
(J]

~-LA1 NTIFF' S ASSIGNOR

IS ESTOPPED

TO ASSERT THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTE.
(4)

THE NOTE IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE

IT IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

IF PLAINTIFFIS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE,
HE CAN OBLY RECOVER TO TEE EXTENT OF

THE VALUE WHICH HE HASPAID, WHEN HE

RECEIVED NOTICE OF AN INFIRMITY IN .THE
NOTE, ANDRE HAS NOT

PAID THE FULL AMOUN,T

WHICH HE HAS AGREED TO PAY.
10
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LEGAL ARGUEMENTI
PLAINT!):4'F IS NOT AHOLDER IN DUE COU-RSE
1

BECAUSE HE DID NOT PAY VALUE.
Title

44-1-53

UCA (1953) provides:

A holder in due course is a holder

who has taken theinstrument under
the following conditions:
(1) That it is complete and regular
on its face.
(2l That he became the holQ.er of it
before it was overdue and without
notice that it had been previously
dishonored, if such was the fact.
(3) That he took it in good f&ith
and for value.
<4l That at thetime it was negotiated
to him hehad no notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in
th~ title of the person negotiiting
it.
Qualifications

~,and

2 are not in issue.

Plaintiffhas shown that he took thenota
on the strength of advances which he
had made to his father.

Most, if not
-

all of ·.these advances took the form of
actually paying a debt of his father bm
a thi.rd party for the father

mother.

o~

the

The testimony of the plaintifr

11
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is that "My father and mother had accomodated me, so I

at that time.

turned that money to them
I advanced the money to

them because they needed it ••• "

The tes1t-

imony of the father is that ''We, like

other parents did a lot for our ehildren,
they help us back later on.

I hope we

are not different from other folks in
that respect."
It is an elementary proposition of law

that for a recoverable debt, in law, to
occur on the strength,of one paying money
for another, there must be an expectation

of repayment, and an expectation or a
promise from the latter party that he
will repay the person so paying his indebtedness.

In this case, there isno

testimony to the effect that there was

any e~ectation'to repay.

The testimony

clearly infers that there was no promis&
to repay· the payments, and that there was·

12
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no expectation to repay shown at all.
The authorities generally suppci.rt the

proposition

~hat

a subsequent promise

to repay the one who hasmade a. payment
as~

for the promisor is not the same
original request to .pay,the

de~t,

an

and

is therefore not a sufficient consideration to supp-ort the promise to repay.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co ..
mpany v. Green 1.85 Mass 306 1904 ( 70 NE
202).

It is clear that one who volunt-

arily pays a debt for a third person and
who has_not been previously promised
that he would be repaid, cannot recove.r
the money paid from the debtor.
Babcock 171 NYS. 1078 1918..

In

Re

To carry the

point to its end, if plaintiff isonly a
donee, that is, having given no consideration for the note,. then he,. can have

no more rights than his donor.

Holladay-

v. Rich 93 Neb 491 1913 (lL~o NW 794).

13
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The defense maintains that the testimony
shows that there was no promise

to

re-·

pay, or that the payments were made
voluntarily (ie:

officiously) and that
~

in either case, a subsequent promise

repay does not color the transcation
with the consideration necessary to support the proposition that plaintiff has,
paid value for the note.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE;
BECAUSE HE DID NOT TAKE IN GOOD FAITH.

In the case of National Bank of
v. Price -Ut-

1924,(234 P

Repub~lie·,

231)~ the

Utah Court held that the fact that the
holder did not give full value. is a

cir~

eilnl.stance: bearing on the issue of the
good faith of the taker.

The cases are

all clear that discounts of
and even

25%

5%

and 10%

do not raise any presumption:

that the holder took in bad faith.

But

at the other extreme, the cases are also
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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clear that if one payes only a nominal
_consideration, then he can not be a
holder in due course.

(Sapp v Lifrano

-·Ariz- 193L~ (36P2d 794) •.

plaintiff has

11

Here, the

@-dvanced 11 $215.50 to his

father prior to receiving

~the

note for

$850.00, upon which had been paiq dow.m
to about

$8oo.oo.

In short, tha plaintiff,

being the son of the payee, must ha_ve

known the basis of the note,- and that
it was of value because there was land .
previously valued at -~P3, 200 for which

it was the purported b.a.lance due.

That

is, the plaintiff knew that the note was
worth its face value, and the defendant
had made payments upon it, still, he took
the note on an initial

'~p.aym.ent n

one fourth its value.

Defendant contends

of only

that the actual knowledge of the plaintiff
of these facts coupled with the Durchase

at so great a discount is sufficient
to negative any pretense of actual good
faith in which the 9laintiff claims he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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took the note.

THE PERSONAL DEFENSES OF THE MAKER,
PARLEY JONES ARE AVAILABLE AGAINST
TirE PLAINTIFF.

(1)

THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE

NOTE.
The note was purportedly given as the
balance due on the land.

Defendant

claims that he fully paid for the
land, and that he could not have owed
the plain~iffs assignor over $400Testimony of plaintifls.assignor is to
the effect that he compromised $350 or

$4oo.

Defendants testimony is to the

effect that he borrowed the $2,000
finish paying Mr Bell.

Clearly the

imputation of this is that he did pay
the whole sum to Mr Bell.

true, then on a·

4%

If this '·be

interest basis, he

would have owed· Mr B,ell. only $240, and.
on a

5%

basis he would have owed him

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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only

$355.

Mr. B:ell compromised, ac-

eor4ing to the agreement, the existing
obligation of
Defendant,

$400

now due him from

Thereafter, he alleied

that after the compromise of the

$4oo,

(the existing obligation) then he executed an $8So note.

The testimony of

P-laintiff's assignor is confusing.
Certainly, if any sum was owing, then he:
compromised all of it, then there could
not be any balance of $850 still owing.
The only remaining balance was the

$400 which was comp)romis-·ed. in·· the
down agreement, and the

$850

s-~ale

note, being

unsupported by any consideration at all,.
was not an obligation

w~th

which the

defendant could be charged by the payee.
That was more than he claimed from
Defendant at all.

(2)

THE MAKER OF THE NOTE AND PLAIN-

17
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TIFF'S ASSIGNOR HAD A COMPLETE ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION.
Plaintiff's Assignor was paid $150 on
behalf of Defendant on the strength
of this compromise that he· would release
him of all his indebtedness.
UCA

Under

1953 44-1-121:
A negotiable instrument is discharged:
(1) lay payment in due course by
or on behalf of the principal
debt.or.
By any other act which will
discharge a simple contract for the
payment of money.

<4)

Plaintiff's own complaint alleged that
the note was executed and delivered on
July 20, prior to the scale down. ag·ree-

ment.

The defendant maintains that it

must have been included in the existing
obligation if it ever existed at all
as a valid debt, and was compromised
~nd

given a complete accord and sat-

isfaction.
Clearly a compromise is recognized in

18
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the law as a reputable, legally sufficient and socially desireable method of
satisfying deb:ts.

Consideration for a

compromise is the valid dispute as to
the amount of the claim.

That such a

compromise settles a claim will not
admit of

dispu~e.

Pl.aintiff 1 s assignor, in the compromise
agreement represented that

$4oo

was the

existing obligation between him and the
-Defendant and he signed a document admitting that figure was also to be
the basis of a full satisfaction o,f his

claim.

His testimony also states that

he thought that the note was given to

him at the end of this scale down
transcation.
that only

Obviously, if he says

$400 is owed him, and he sett-

les that for ~150, how can he say that
he has any claim to any more money.
That is, he can not claim
;,

$850 more

owing him after he has stated that only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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19

.l\4 00

~)

was

owed him.

To do so would

allow him to claim other sums.

(3) PLAINTIFF 1 ·S ASSIGNOh IS ESTOPPED

TO ASSERT THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTE.
Now the plaintiff's assignor knew

t~t

the purpose of the defendant in securing the loan and the scale down agreement was to consolidate his debt and so
to pay one creditor.

Yet the plaintiff's

assignor stoo4 by andled the defendant
to believe that he only claimed

$4oo,

and on this basis, the defendant thought

that he had settled the whole claim.
On these facts, the plaintiff's assignor
is estopped to assert the validity of
the noteor enforce it by reason that the
defendant changedhis· position to his detriment in relying upon the representations
of the plaintiff's assignor.

I.X.L.

Stores Company v. Success Markets 98 Ut
20
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160 1939 (97 P2d 577}~ where the court
statedthat the vital principle is that
J

he \vho, by his language or conduct,
leads another to do what he wouldnot
otherwise have done, shall not

subjec~

such person to loss or injury by dissapointing the expectations upon which
he acted.

Such a change_of position is

sternly fortiidden.

This remedy is always

applied so as to promote the ends of
justice.

It is avall.able only for pro-

tection and cannot be used as a weapon:
of assault.

Defendant comesunder ·this

doctrine in that the plaintiff 1 s assig:t1or
failed to deny the validity of the

not~,

and h~ failed to statethat he recogni~ed it as a binding debt.

stated tbat

He impliedly-

the defendant was only in-

debted to him in the amount of

$4oo.

Therefore the plaintiff's assignor
should be in all equity and justice and
2].
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is estopped to assert the validity of
the note.
(LL)

THE NOTE IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAD.SE

IT CU.NTRAVENES PUBLIC POLICY·-

The purpose of tl1e J:t,ederal Farm Mortgage.

Loan Corporation was to consolidate the
financial position of the farmer b.y
placing his indebtedness under one loan,

The

secured by a mortgage on his land.

creditors would be calledin as in this
case and they would declare the amount
8

that the debto·r owed them.,

The Federal

Farm Mortgage Loan Corporation would
then endeavor to have the parties sella
down their indebtedness.

If indebted-

ness was purposefully or accidentally
left out, then that would defeat the
·purpose of the transaction in that it
would leave the debtor, farmer

V'Ti

th

more~

obligations falling currently due than
he could meet.

That is, he would have

too high a periodic payment, because
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because the loan corporation would have
the debtor paying as high as possible
That is, then th.e

to repay the loan.
indebtedness which

w~s.lef~

out of the

agreement would tend to defeat the
or public policy of the statute.

pu~ose

Witness

Natkins from the Federal Land B-ank stated

1

that if a man sca.led down, it settled
the obligation.

Then there could also

be no additional obligation because none
(

was declared.

It would also work a hard-

ship, which was not contracted for, on
the other creditors in that they agree4
that each would scale down a certain
I

amount, en nsidering the amount that he
was owed.
lared

~ebt,

But if there were s:> me

undee~-

then to enforce paying that

would be in the nature of giving a preference to that particular creditor.

The

creditors never anticipated doing this,
in light of their agreement in the scale
down.

("the condition that the applicants

23
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total indebtedness, both secured and unsecured shall not exceed a certain stated
amount").

That is, they each signedin

consideration that all would scale down
their total indebtedness, no less, and
forever discharge the debtor of liability.
That courts do deny enforcen1ent of notes

against public policy, in the case of
~anson

v. harris

51 Ut 396 1918 1170

P

970}, the court allovled a defense of
being against public policy o/n a- note
which had been given as a "commission''
to a publicofficer who claimedthe ·commission for getting the maker a public
contract.

IF THE PLADTIFF IS AHOLDER IN DUE COURSE,
HE CAN OBLY RECOVER TO THE EXTEN.T TO WHICH

ffE

~ASPAID

VALUE, IF HE HASPAIDLESS THAN

HE P.tAS AGREED TO PJSY. FOR THE NOTE, vVHEN

HE RECEIVES NOTICE OF INFIRMITIES.
The plaintiff, at the time he received
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.

the note, had advanced money to his parents
in the sum of ~215.50.

Later, he claim-

ed that he paid $323.00 for the note.
He also stated and attempted to prove
that he advanced other sums at later
dates.

Plaintiffhas indicated therefore' ·

that he hasmore to pay for the note.
UCA

1S53 44-1-55 provides:

WHen the transferee·rece~ves notice of any infirmity mn the instrument or defect in
the title of the person negotiating
the same before he haspaid the full.
amount agreed to be paid therefor,
he will be deemed a holder in due
course only to the extent of the amount
theretofore paid by him.

Plaintiff tried to prove sums subsequent
to the receipt of the note in amounts
over

$4oo.

That is, up to the time that

he did not know the note was bad, he
proved that he had advance.d ;$21.5 • .50, or
at most $323.60, yet still infering that
he was paying more all of the time by
attempting to show that he advanced moneys
at later dates.

Bush

41

In the case of Felt v

Ut 462 1912 (126 P 688), the
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court states that"a.ll that section was
intended to accomplish was to limit the
indorsees' recovery to the amount he

had advanced before obtaining notice of
some infirmity rbn the paper·."
That

~s,

he is still a holder in due

course, but he can recover no more than
he paid for the note.

The maker is

protected to the extent that the holder
is not harmed, and the holder will be
protected to the extent that he paid

v&i.ue.
lf entitled to recover at all, the

plaintiff is limited to the figure of

$215.50, against which the defendant
has a set off of payment in the amount
of $240.00 as admitted by plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff is not a holder in due
course because he has given no value
and he did not take in good faith.
Therefore the personal defenses of the
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maker are good as against him, and the
•

defenses of accord and satisfaction,
failure of consideration, .estoppel to
assert validity of the note andthe
defense of unenforceability as against
public policy make out a perfect
defense of non liability on the note.
Therefore·the appellant-defendant
requests the court to reverse the
judgement of the trial court and to
dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff
with costs~ ·and to give judgement for appellant
on his counterclaim: $2~0 with interest.
In the alternative, if the eourt finds
the plaintiff a polder-in due course,
under the alternative defense, defendant appellant requests the court reverse
the judgement of the court below in so
far as it granted more than

$215.50,

and

to allow the defendant-appellant a set
off against that sum in tha amount of
~2!~.0. 00,

and that therefore that there

would be no attorney's fee or costs.
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